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War College: Book Reviews

BOOK REVIEWS

TIMING IS EVERYTHING
Snow, Donald M., When America Fights: The Uses of U.S. Military Forces. Washington, D.C.: Congressional
Quarterly Press, 2000. 221pp. $ 24.95

“Timing is everything,” so the saying
goes. Timing was certainly a factor in developing a fair and reasoned review for
this book; it arrived in this reviewer’s
mailbox on 12 September 2001. Since the
major thesis of Donald Snow’s concise
and cogent work is that peacekeeping will
be the most likely type of early
twenty-first century military operation
for the United States, the book initially
appeared quaint and somewhat nostalgic:
how nice and simple it would be to deal
with questions of how to bring and sustain peace to other lands.
However, when the inevitable strong feelings associated with the horrific attacks
of 11 September dissipate somewhat, one
finds this book to be a valuable, if flawed,
addition to the professional national security studies student’s library. There is
no other single work available comparable in scope to this book in its thorough
investigation of the driving forces, necessities, and demands of peace operations.
Snow, recognizing the ad hoc nature of
much, if not most, national security literature, has attempted to develop an integrated approach, connecting theory to
practice, and yielding findings and

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2002

conclusions that should awaken and disturb those in the national security
strategy establishment. He begins with a
broad diagnosis of a national security
policy “adrift” in the first decade following the end of the Cold War, explaining
well why realist and neorealist paradigms
of international relations and the use of
force no longer can explain or predict
real-world behaviors. Similarly, he introduces the concept of a two-tiered world,
with developed free market democracies
in the first tier, and all others in the second. It is with this second, heterogeneous
group of nations that Snow finds that the
realist paradigm cannot explain or describe behaviors and relationships, which
in that group are sometimes chaotic.
Snow uses this observation to develop in
the second chapter a theoretical construct by which the United States can
adapt its strategic “lens” to focus better
on security problems with second-tier
nations, combining the still-relevant aspects of the realist legacy with idealist
paradigmatic tensions (between internationalism and isolationism). Carefully
constructing his case, Snow then describes the spectrum of conflict that he
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believes the United States might experience. He finds that the most likely form
of conflict will be Kosovo-like peace operations, and he explains why operations
addressing these conflicts are so difficult.
This section provides some of the most
dramatic and compelling information
and analysis in the book, particularly
concerning his operational distinctions
between conflict suppression and state
building (the latter being the most problematic for this country). When America
Fights concludes with a recommendation
of realistic internationalist national strategy based on five major influences of
modern grand strategy, and it offers the
reader fifteen guidelines on how to increase the probability of success in peace
operations.
The book provides a consistent thread of
argument and analysis on the use of
American armed force. However, notwithstanding the author’s preface, When
America Fights is a highly opinionated
work. It does not comprehensively analyze the implications of other possible
points on the spectrum of conflict, nor
does it pursue alternative or possible
conflictual guidelines that might be generated by applying the theoretical framework to those other types of conflict.
Further, the two-tier world concept simply is neither the only way nor the most
widely accepted one of attempting to organize the chaos of the post–Cold War
international environment. Finally, the
conclusion that there are two types of
armed force employments—of necessity
(forced on the nation) or of choice (at
the nation’s discretion)—is most intriguing (I have already adopted the lexicon in
my courses) but it is not the only
typology that one might consider.
There are two admittedly minor but irritating faults in the book. First, being a
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very old-fashioned academic, this
reviewer appreciates the value and information provided by footnotes; they are
totally lacking in this work. True, there is
a bibliography following each chapter,
but that is an empty vessel for serious research. Second, Ralph Peters, a most insightful strategist of the current age who
is quoted in the last chapter, is a retired
Army, not Air Force, officer.
When America Fights is an excellent book
on the use of armed force as applied to
peace operations. It is a book with a
point of view and a strong theoretical
base. Regardless of whether one agrees
with the author on the flow and form of
his argument, the reader will find the
material engrossing and invaluable—
even though this nation is now engaged
in what Snow has viewed as the less likely
scenario for force employment, that of
necessity.
JONATHAN E. CZARNECKI

Naval War College, Monterey Programs Office

Carter, Ashton B., and John P. White, eds. Keeping
the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001. 326pp. $50

This book “addresses a need widely recognized but long neglected: to adapt and
modernize the system by which the
United States manages the largest and
most successful security establishment in
history.” Do not be misled into thinking
that the word “managing” in the title
suggests a dry treatment of managerial
practices requiring extensive change.
Keeping the Edge deals with that, but it
primarily examines many key organizational strategy issues; these studies will
have comprehensive value to anyone
within academia or the national security
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environment wishing to improve what
the authors regard as management and
organizational shortfalls that impede implementation of wise strategy and policy
choices. Collectively, the distinguished
editors and authors contend that, if unattended, these shortcomings will seriously
diminish our unmatched military capability. At the same time, they hold that
the “national security establishment is
deficient not so much in deciding what
to do” as in lacking the means to implement defense policy effectively.
The book is organized into eleven chapters, each of which discusses deficiencies
in a key area of national security. Each
chapter describes the changing security
environment relevant to the subject of
discussion, then offers comprehensive
suggestions to improve the execution of
whatever policy choices are made. Most
of the chapters also provide superb insight into what future policy choices
should be. Among the chapters are:
“Managing Defense for the Future,”
“Keeping the Edge in Joint Operations,”
“Exploiting the Internet Revolution,”
“Keeping the Edge in Intelligence,”
“Countering Asymmetric Threats,”
“Keeping the Technological Edge,” “Advancing the Revolution in Business Affairs,” “Ensuring Quality People in
Defense,” “Managing the Pentagon’s International Relations,” “Strengthening
the National Security Interagency Process,” and “Implementing Change.” Each
chapter is comprehensive and would
serve as an excellent guide to new policy
makers who wish actually to see their
policies implemented. I doubt that any
organizational or managerial improvement has been omitted.
The material in the book resulted from a
research collaboration project between
the Kennedy School of Government,
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Harvard University, and Stanford
University. The list of contributors represents a who’s who in national security experience and in the study of national
security processes: Ashton B. Carter,
David Chu, Victor A. DeMarines, John
Deutch, Robert J. Hermann, Arnold
Kanter, Michael J. Lippitz, Judith A.
Miller, Sean O’Keefe, William J. Perry,
Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, Brent
Scowcroft, John M. Shalikashvili, and
John P. White. The core group of authors
have occupied practically every senior
position in the national security environment, while others have dedicated their
professional lives to the study of national
security policies and supporting structures. They speak with as much authority
as one could possibly find in a single
book.
This book addresses those in policy positions who wish to reform organizations
and practices that, according to the authors, increasingly sap the vitality of our
military capability; it is concrete as well
as comprehensive in its recommendations. Keeping the Edge will also help people who are not currently in positions to
affect policy to understand the substantial flaws in the anatomy and physiology
of the organizations that implement national security policies. Experienced national security scholars and practitioners
will respond to the authors’ contention
that existing policy-implementing practices themselves are a threat to future
U.S. national security.
The book must be read by anyone interested in improving these processes and
structures; it contains important guides
for people who can marshal the influence
at least to begin organizational and managerial change, if only on the margin. The
preface warns that the authors have no illusions that the chronic organizational

3

Naval War College Review, Vol. 55 [2002], No. 1, Art. 13
148

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

and management problems will be solved
any time soon. One can only hope, nevertheless, that this book’s comprehensive
recommendations will encourage and
guide courageous leaders to make a start.
WILLIAM E. TURCOTTE

Naval War College

Steinbruner, John D. Principles of Global Security.
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000.
270pp. $44.95

Unconvincing—that one word accurately
describes this effort of the prolific author
and former Brookings fellow John
Steinbruner to explain why and how the
“potentially catastrophic consequences of
traditional security practices” mandate
radical changes in U.S. defense policies.
Steinbruner argues that discontinuities in
the international system make obsolete
the realist view that nation-states need to
rely on military power for their security.
From this premise, he implies that the
United States should not seek to maintain military superiority over potential
opponents. In this new formula, deterrence, which he describes as a Cold War
doctrine, should be “subordinated to the
countervailing idea of reassurance.”
Globalization, Steinbruner holds, has
made it “too expensive to rule by force,”
and competition among nations or societies is being replaced by cooperation;
therefore, the whole notion of needing a
strong military defense is dangerous. Unfortunately for his premise, Steinbruner
then turns around and uses a pseudorealist argument to explain why other nations would “naturally” seek to oppose
and confront American military superiority in a world in which they are
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benefiting from United States–led
globalization.
At its core, the book’s fundamental problem is that it approaches all military issues as if they were but subsets of
strategic nuclear deterrence. The irony of
this approach—Cold War thinking at its
grimmest—appears completely to have
eluded the author, who spent much of
his scholarly career worrying about issues
of deterrence theory and nuclear command and control. At the same time,
Steinbruner does not see the end of the
Cold War as a victory for deterrence or
democratic ideology. Referring to it
rather as an unexpected “spontaneous
event” that took everyone involved by
surprise, he sees it as the result of “the
working of very large forces”—presumably the forces of globalization, although
he is never very clear on that.
Steinbruner’s treatment of globalization
itself—which he describes only in terms
of advances in technology and population dynamics—is disappointing. Others
have written much better treatments. The
book does not contain a serious examination of the direct impact of globalization on national security or military
forces, only a continuing assertion that
globalization has effects and that, whatever they are, they justify adoption of the
author’s “reassurance” policies. These
policies are similar to, but more radical
and seemingly less practical than, those
put forward as “cooperative security” by
former secretary of defense William
Perry. He certainly would not agree with
Steinbruner that all national militaries
must be equalized in capabilities and
force structure. Steinbruner cites the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
and the founding of Nato as examples of
reassurance and equal treatment of nations
in regard to security, but he forgets to
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mention violations of the NPT or to explain why nations would have joined Nato
had there been no inequitable Soviet threat.
Even those who share the author’s beliefs
in a smaller American defense structure
or minimal deterrence would be confused by many of his supporting reasons.
At one point, Steinbruner castigates the
former colonial powers for not intervening quickly enough in the civil wars of
their violence-prone former colonies.
How would they do so without possessing superior military force? Steinbruner
describes the internal conflict that
plagues much of the world, including terrorism, as a “contagion”—as if it were a
theoretical illness that had nothing to do
with actions of actual people. As in the
logic (some might say illogic) of the prisoners’ dilemma and tit-for-tat games
once used to describe the theory of nuclear deterrence, neither the magnanimity nor the fears of the human spirit play
a role in this book’s equation.
Despite the publisher’s reputation and
the implied support of influential
(mostly retired) authorities, serious students of globalization or defense policy
should avoid this book. It is not merely a
weak argument; these are not principles
of global security for the real world.
SAM TANGREDI

Captain, U.S. Navy
National Defense University, Washington, D.C.

Williams, Cindy, ed. Holding the Line: U.S. Defense
Alternatives for the 21st Century. Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press, 2001. 289pp. $21.95

This is the rare book that actually lives up
to its blurbs. It should be required reading for U.S. defense planners, especially
Bush administration officials for whom
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increasing defense spending rather than
“holding the line” is an article of faith.
They would profit greatly from the volume’s analysis of where not to look for
the savings that might pay for the administration’s promised transformation of
the military. Hint: cutting infrastructure
will not pay for military transformation.
Cindy Williams, a senior research fellow
in the Strategic Studies Program at MIT
and a former assistant director for national security at the Congressional Budget Office, has assembled an impressive
group of contributors. In a focused, well
integrated volume, they take on a range
of pressing defense issues that converge
on a central, critical question: how can
the U.S. military be reshaped—transformed—while holding the line on defense spending? Holding the line means
maintaining defense spending at about
$300 billion (in fiscal year 2000 budgetauthority dollars) for ten years. That
amount, it is argued, is sufficient for
transformation if it is spent effectively
and efficiently—which requires merely
discarding outmoded strategy and force
structure.
In her introductory chapter, Williams
lays the foundation for what follows with
an instructive discussion of the post–Cold
War drawdown, the pressures generating
rising defense costs, the reasons we
should not succumb to those pressures,
and the need to reconcile strategy and
practice and to recalibrate the twomajor-theater-wars yardstick that was
used to size U.S. conventional forces after
the Gulf War. An effective force-protection
device, the two-major-theater-wars standard is both the source of rising defense
costs and an obstacle to a fiscally responsible transformation of the U.S. military.
Williams is especially struck by the fact
that each service’s share of defense
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spending has been held essentially constant since the end of the Cold War.
Strategy and force structure alternatives
advanced by three of the contributors
propose to take care of that problem.
Lawrence Korb develops Williams’s account of contemporary defense planning
with a critical appraisal of the Pentagon’s
three post–Cold War reassessments—the
first Bush administration’s 1990 “Base
Force,” which introduced the two-majorregional-wars construct; the Clinton administration’s 1993 Bottom-Up Review;
and the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, which also embraced the two-war
view. Korb also delightfully exposes the
misleading assumptions that inform the
conventional wisdom about the inadequacy of current levels of defense
spending.
The search for ways to utilize Department of Defense monies more effectively
and efficiently begins with nonsolutions.
Williams convincingly argues that infrastructure reform—eliminating functions,
consolidating and collocating activities,
privatization, and outsourcing—“will not
be the miracle cure for the Pentagon’s
budget woes.” Gordon Adams finds that
for strategic, political, technological, and
economic reasons, contemporary burden
sharing by America’s European allies can
yield no more of a budgetary payoff than
it did during the Cold War. Further cuts
in nuclear forces will not result in significant savings either, according to David
Mosher, who expects, not unreasonably,
that “missile defenses will be the most
likely cause of budget growth.”
The resources required for transformation can only be extracted from the conventional force structure. It is the Army,
Air Force, or Navy (and Marines)—take
your pick—that will bear the brunt of restructuring. Owen Cote advances the
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alternative likely to be most popular
among readers of this journal—a navalcentric strategy and force structure that
features a significantly more innovative
Navy. Under this alternative, a somewhat
smaller Air Force and a more significantly reduced but more mobile Army
would be the bill payers. James Quinlivan
proposes what he considers a balanced
future force structure centered on a reorganized, modernized Army. The Navy
would lose two carrier battle groups under this alternative; the Marine Corps
and the Air Force would be smaller as
well. To support what he labels a “flexible
power projection strategy,” Karl Mueller
would shift resources from the Army and
Navy to a modernized, more capable Air
Force. The Army would give up 30 percent of its active combat forces and
two-thirds of its National Guard units,
while the Navy would have to make do
with nine rather than twelve aircraft
carriers.
Cote, Quinlivan, and Mueller each identify the strategic assumptions upon
which their respective force structures
are built. Their assumptions about the
future security environment differ significantly. Unfortunately, we do not know
what that security environment will actually look like. Defense planners, by nature cautious and conservative in the face
of uncertainty, will want to hedge against
each set of problems the authors identify;
one way of doing this is to acquire the
full range of capabilities they describe. In
the end, while we know we should look
to the conventional force structure to resolve the resource dilemma, the dilemma
remains unresolved. What we still need is
a reliable means of choosing among the
assumptions—no small intellectual challenge. A larger dose of grand strategy
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than provided in Williams’s introductory
chapter is required for that undertaking.
ANDREW L. ROSS

Naval War College

Brasher, Bart. Implosion: Downsizing the U.S. Military, 1987–2015. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 2000.
257pp. $67

Bart Brasher begins his retrospective discussion of Implosion with a simple synopsis in chapter 1, “The Last 1,000 Days
of the Cold War.” Mentioned in this
chapter is a discussion of the period of
the Reagan administration when Defense
personnel numbers and budget authority
reached their peaks. He includes interesting USA Today statistics about defense
spending in the United States and in the
USSR, as well as a breakdown of how
many soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
Marines were serving. He also discusses
how each service recruits, tests, and promotes its enlisted and officer personnel.
Brasher then proceeds to the topic of the
security environment (primarily by describing where U.S. military forces are
deployed and in what numbers), the demise of the Soviet Union, and various
operations that the U.S. military was involved in through the end of the 1980s.
He closes this chapter with a discussion
of the base realignment process, military
readiness at the end of the Cold War, and
the size of the Army, Navy, Air Force,
Marine Corps, reserve components, and
nuclear forces.
The book’s style is readable, and Brasher
takes time to explain acronyms, even to
describe how civilian control of the military is organized. His explanations about
the military and government processes
are clear even for the uninitiated.
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However, it is clear well before the end of
the first chapter that the author’s approach consists primarily of stringing together information gleaned from various
sources; the first thirty-four-page chapter
contains 151 endnotes. Also, the book is
replete with numbers and statistics; the
average paragraph contains at least two
or three. For example, the following is
the concluding paragraph of the discussion of Operation JUST CAUSE: “Casualty
figures for the invasion included 24
Americans dead, including two who were
killed accidentally by their own forces.
The number of U.S. wounded was 324,
while the PDF suffered 314 killed, 124
wounded, and 5,313 captured. Serious
estimates of Panamanian noncombatants
killed ran from 100 to 202. Within a few
years, Panama was a democracy and
Noriega was in a stateside prison, convicted of the narcotics charges brought
against him.”
The next several chapters fall into a pattern. For each year from 1990 through
1994, Brasher uses statistical tidbits to
discuss human resources, the security environment, the “Base Force” (and other
alternate force structures), military readiness, and downsizing. Each chapter sets
forth the “security environment,” a chronological account of defense and military
issues, primarily illuminated by forcedeployment statistics. Subchapters cover
in a clear and concise fashion such subjects
as contingency operations, the BottomUp Review, the base closure process,
modernization, and “topsizing.” Chapter
7 covers the downsizing of the military
from 1995 and 1996, and chapter 8 covers the “Quadrennial Defense Review and
the Out-Years, 1997 to 2015.” Brasher’s
conclusions, which occupy two pages, include: “Although many equate the initiation of personnel and force structure
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reductions with the end of the Cold War in
1989 or the breakup of the Soviet Union in
1991, DOD, as a whole, started downsizing in 1988. The Army and Air Force
started trimming forces in 1987 and the
Marine Corps followed suit the following
year. The Navy did not start reducing
numbers until 1990”; “For the most part,
it seems though DOD has managed to
keep the cream of the crop in a smaller
labor pool. . . . [T]he quality of the Army
officer contingent, already high, has been
improved by the SSB and VSI initiatives,
as most of the commissioned soldiers accepting the bonuses were from the bottom third of their year-groups”; “Some
were concerned that AfricanAmericans, as well as other minorities,
might bear a disproportionate share of
military personnel cuts, but that has not
transpired. Along the same line, opportunities for women in the armed forces
have not been put on hold because of the
downsizing. In fact, their representation
has reached record levels”; “Local communities have been hurt by the reduction
in the number of DOD installations that
started in 1988. However, in many cases,
that damages have been significantly less
than originally estimated. Thanks to a
higher percentage of personnel cuts than
base closures, the infrastructure of our
fighting establishment is now even more
out of sync with force structure than it
was in 1987.”
Other conclusions address the need for
increased modernization funding, force
hollowness (although not on the scale
seen in the 1970s), and reductions in personnel and funding (unaccompanied by
reductions in global security
commitments).
The author (a former Air Force officer of
thirteen years’ service) has consulted

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol55/iss1/13

hundreds of sources for his book. The
bibliography is sixteen pages long. The
numbers and statistics are interesting individually, though their sheer volume is
overwhelming. The appendices are simple graphs showing a downward trend
from 1987 to 1998. What is missing are
conclusions and projections (beyond
those contained in the Quadrennial Defense Review) about the implications.
Implosion does a credible job of describing, with key statistics and simple explanations, the magnitude and process of
the downsizing of the military (the active
components were reduced 35.3 percent
between 1987 and 1998), but Brasher
seems too enamored of statistical pronouncements, leaving the reader waiting
for an answer to the question “What does
it all mean?” What will this massive force
and budgetary reduction mean for the
future of the United States military and
its role on the international stage?
If you are looking for a book full of quotable, surprising, and interesting statistics,
or for a concise, clearly explained, chronological timeline of how the military
was downsized since 1987, this book is
for you. However, you will not find pronouncements or predictions about how
the reduction in military forces and
funding, so carefully detailed and described, will affect the future. Nor does
this book pass judgment or offer praise
or criticism of how the downsizing occurred. Brasher discusses downsizing
much as a good reporter might (just the
facts), rather than as a commentator or
political analyst. Given the time frame
advertized in the title (1987–2015), the
author has done only half his job.
CARL CARLSON

Commander, U.S. Navy
Naval War College
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Daalder, Ivo H., and Michael E. O’Hanlon. Winning
Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo. Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000. 343pp. $26.95

Since the end of the Cold War, Nato has
been experiencing an identity crisis that
has not yet been completely resolved. In
the last decade instability has been Nato’s
principal adversary, and the Balkans, as a
result of the atrocities of Slobodan
Milosevic, became its prime area of interest. In March 1999, following the Serb tyrant’s driving of eight hundred thousand
Albanian Kosovars from Serbia, Nato
fought, and won, a war to return and
protect Kosovo’s Albanian population.
Winning Ugly is a recounting of the
causes, conduct, and consequences of
this war. It is derived from interviews of
many of its central players by experts on
Balkan policy and security affairs. Not
surprisingly, this conflict has been dissected and closely scrutinized by many
pundits, because its lessons will play a
central role in fashioning future alliance
defense policies, as well as U.S. force
planning and doctrine development.
Daalder and O’Hanlon scrutinize virtually all elements of the Kosovo operation,
and they are both understanding and
critical. As to the causes and inevitability
of the conflict, the authors conclude that,
given Milosevic’s perfidy and malice, it
would have been difficult for Nato to
avoid taking military action. As to the result, they unabashedly declare Nato the
victor, with few qualifications. In fact,
the authors’ assessment should be labeled
“near term,” since we have yet to witness
enduring stability in the region as a result of the conflict and the subsequent
Nato “occupation” of the province.
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Daalder and O’Hanlon’s examination of
the conduct of the war, however, is the
best part of the book, bringing to light
the strategic and tactical mistakes
committed by Nato’s heads of state, diplomats, and generals alike. Perhaps the
most important of the internal conflicts
were between (and among) Americans, a
point underlined in General Wesley
Clark’s recent account of the Kosovo
conflict, Waging Modern War.
The role that the air campaign played to
achieve overall success in the war is a
point hotly debated in defense-policy circles. Kosovo was proclaimed exclusively
an air war, President Clinton having
promised that the United States had no
intention of fighting a ground war in the
Balkans. It was a remarkably successful
one, at that; air defense capability by the
Yugoslav armed forces was moderate, yet
no Nato pilot lost his life in combat. But
this was not initially the air war that U.S.
Air Force strategists had envisioned—pilots were restricted to flying above fifteen
thousand feet, and target sets were limited early in the war due to asset availability and bad weather. Most
importantly, the thrust of “effects-based
operations” (in this case, bending the enemy’s will through paralyzing the country’s infrastructure) was diluted, as the
Nato alliance pursued elusive Yugoslav
tanks in the Kosovo countryside.
However, as the war progressed, American air-combat strategy increasingly held
sway, while Milosevic continued to hold
firm. The authors conclude that the diplomatic consensus was that the Yugoslav
dictator did not consider blinking until
faced with a united alliance that began
talking seriously about a ground war.
Milosevic eventually yielded when his last
possible ally, Russia, conspicuously associated itself with the message of alliance
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resolve. The authors leave us with the
(lukewarm) lesson that airpower, properly employed, is a necessary, albeit insufficient, tool of defense and foreign
policy.
The Kosovo war provides today’s students of international affairs a textbook
case in the traditional art of statecraft in
the world of realpolitik. Many old lessons
are emphasized: strategy must be driven
by policy, coercive diplomacy works only
when one possesses military might and
resolve, armed forces must be given
proper strategic direction, and alliance
solidarity is crucial.
However, Winning Ugly adds new lessons
as well, because Kosovo was Nato’s principal test to date in conducting military
operations outside its borders against a
sovereign nation for essentially humanitarian purposes. Nato’s performance in
Kosovo may have helped define the practicality and desirability of this role in the
twenty-first-century world. This book
enhances our understanding of what may
become the future of Nato as well as
some part of the future of war.
TOM FEDYSZYN

Naval War College

House, Jonathan M. Combined Arms Warfare in the
Twentieth Century. Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas,
2001. 364pp. $45

A retired Army officer formerly on the
faculty of the Command and General
Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Jonathan House has written an updated edition of a text he authored in the
1980s to support the education of Army
officers. His express intentions are to
strip the jargon in order to make the
subject intelligible to a more general
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readership, and to update the book with
an analysis of combined-arms progress
in the 1990s. The result is a readable and
lucid analysis of combined-arms warfare
in the twentieth century, a work that a
layman can follow without keeping a dictionary of military terms handy.
For those with a genuine interest in military affairs, this book is ultimately rewarding. However, it is more about
organizational dynamics than about battles and tactics, and that may prove tedious to the casual reader. House
methodically traces the development of
combined-arms practice in the major armies of the world, offering just enough
description of battles and campaigns to
illustrate the effects of the various technical and organizational developments over
the years.
House tends to focus his analysis through
the lens of organizational design (an inclination shared by this reviewer) and
comes up with some interesting results
that do not always conform to conventional wisdom. For instance, he makes
the case that the French and British defeat in the 1940 Battle of France can be
adequately explained by their centralized
and “stovepiped” organizational structure, which inhibited the formation of
flexible combined-arms task forces.
Moreover, the lack of experience in defending against a fluid combined-arms
offensive caused the allies to create a
rather brittle, forward-focused defense
instead of the defense in tactical and operational depth that was later found effective against the blitzkrieg. In addition,
the failure of the German advance into
the Soviet Union in 1941 was due not so
much to the oft-cited reduction in panzer
divisions (which House cites as an actual
advantage, in that it created more balanced divisional structures) as to the
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failure of the Wehrmacht to prepare logistics support suited to the resulting
depth of the theater.

campaigns. Although his points are otherwise well made, on this issue he seems
to overreach a bit.

If the book has a fault, it lies in the numerous maps and organizational charts
that accompany the text. Though
House’s prose is clear and straightforward, the maps do not help the layman
really grasp the dynamics of the battles.
Similarly, although House thoughtfully
includes a key to the numerous symbols
that soldiers use to depict units on maps
and tables of organization, he leaves out
a number of the more esoteric ones that
inhabit the book. This is a minor irritant—in general the book is well supported by a glossary of technical terms
and acronyms, liberal annotations, and
an extensive bibliography—but it should
be fixed in the next edition if the book is
to be considered a true introductory text.

In summary, Jonathan House has produced a useful and readable text for anyone who wants a better understanding of
how modern armies fight.

House has a clear thesis that permeates
his analysis: combined-arms structure
(comprising tanks, artillery, infantry, helicopters, engineers, etc.) should be integrated at the lowest practicable level and
balanced to provide the most flexibility
to the commander. (In practice, this
seems to occur only at the division or
sometimes the brigade level.) The commander can then select various types of
units to form combined-arms task forces
that can address the type of operations
planned. House’s discussion of the long
and painful history of armies’ struggles to
achieve this balance and flexibility brings
to mind the equally painful attempts at
jointness among services.
House inevitably addresses the issue of
air support as a piece of the combinedarms puzzle. He analytically describes the
objections airmen have to integrating
airpower into a combined-arms ground
organization, but in his conclusions he
argues against separate, air-only

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2002

155

BARNEY RUBEL

Naval War College

McBride, William M. Technological Change and the
United States Navy, 1865–1945. Baltimore, Md.:
Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2000. 352pp. $45

This is not a technological history of the
U.S. Navy per se but rather an exploration of how the dominant culture of the
Navy’s leadership drove specific technological choices in the transition from the
sailing ship of the line to the battleship and then to the aircraft carrier.
McBride’s thesis centers on two points:
that the organization and culture of the
U.S. Navy have traditionally been defined
by its capital ships; and that new technologies challenging the relevance of the
current capital ship are generally resisted
by senior leaders, who seek both to maintain control over change and to inhibit
any developments that suggest a transfer
of power to individuals with the skills,
functions, and organizational relationships of a new “technological paradigm.”
These themes are familiar to those who
follow the academic literature on technology and culture, but McBride is undoubtedly correct in his contention that
there is no widespread understanding of
the specific impact of the dominant service culture on technology selection. A
thorough appreciation of the full range
of forces that drive technological choices
would appear to be particularly
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important in the post–Cold War era, in
which the technological options are so
numerous and specific requirements for
the Navy are so uncertain.
One of McBride’s major goals in this
work is to refute the idea of technological
determinism and demonstrate instead
the importance of culture in technological innovation. He explores in some
depth the intense professional competition between the Navy’s line officers and
engineers during the transition from sail
to steam, and between surface officers
and aviators in the transition from the
battleship to the carrier. He also offers
interesting historical insight into internal
competition for control over the design
details of capital ships during different
eras, with an informative analysis of the
role of naval-industrial relations in the
early debate over the adoption of
turbo-electric drive.
Unfortunately, McBride’s argument
against technological determinism tends
to the opposite extreme, ascribing almost
every technological choice to singleminded efforts by the Navy’s leaders to
maintain the social and cultural status
quo. He characterizes the battleship “paradigm” at the end of the nineteenth century as a “pre-Copernican Ptolemaic
cosmogony,” as if the battleship were not
only the wrong technological choice but
somehow a violation of natural law. He
castigates the U.S. Navy for rejecting a
cruiser-centric commerce-raiding strategy and attributes the choice to blind adherence to the “paramount status” of the
battleship. Yet ultimately McBride does
not refute the case that the transition
from the sailing ship of the line to the
battleship was essentially a deterministic
outcome, nor does he objectively evaluate the failed efforts by others in the
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nineteenth century (most notably the
French) to render the battleship obsolete.
In contrast, McBride largely admits that
the adoption of the aircraft carrier was
more a matter of fortuitous events than
of technological determinism. As he
points out, a narrow difference in timing
in the appearance of radar and the proximity fuse might have doomed the aircraft carrier to irrelevance; it was not
until well into World War II that a carrier could muster sufficient striking
power to hold a combat-ready battleship
at risk. Yet he condemns the Navy’s “battleship thought collective” as early as
World War I for failing to move rapidly
to a sea-based air strike force—including
early adoption of torpedo bombers
(which actually took another twenty-five
years to achieve technological maturity).
There have unquestionably been
Luddites in the Navy’s senior ranks
throughout its history, but there is great
cost and risk in abandoning major military systems that have proven their
worth. McBride is far too prone to condemn the technological caution of past
decision makers, who lacked the benefit
of our hindsight.
It is not clear whom the book was meant
to inform. McBride’s insistence on turgid
academic jargon like “intra-artifact combat” and “obdurate boundary artifact” to
express fairly simple ideas suggests that
he did not intend this work for the reader
inside the military who might actually
make the best use of it. On the other
hand, an academic audience unfamiliar
with naval operations might accept without question McBride’s somewhat preposterous assertions that the “blip
enhance” mode of the ULQ-6 was intended as a suicide device, that an “old
World War II–era destroyer” could sink a
nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, or that
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the cruise missile has long since replaced
the aircraft as the primary means of
strike from the sea.
This volume does add some historical
substance to the important topic of military innovation, but the prospective
reader should be cautioned that it is neither a well balanced nor a comprehensive
account of the impact of technological
change on the U.S. Navy from the Civil
War through World War II.
JAMES R. FITZSIMONDS

Naval War College

Key, David M., Jr., Admiral Jerauld Wright: Warrior
among Diplomats. Manhattan, Kans.: Sunflower Univ.
Press, 2001. 438pp. $22.95

For more than two-thirds of a century, a
host of diplomats, military officers, and
statesmen have been entertained in their
wardrooms, clubs, and drawing rooms
from London to Manila by Jerry Wright’s
stories and vignettes drawn from his remarkable career. After every session, the
inevitable reaction would be, “Jerry,
you’ve got to write a book.”
Now that book has been written by David M. Key, Jr., a nephew of the admiral.
Key, making good use of his Harvard
A.B. in English, does an excellent job in
letting his uncle and his contemporaries
tell the story, while himself providing the
historical context, one that is unusually
rich in drama and import. Fortunately,
Key had much to draw on, and he has
done a thorough and discriminating job
in his research. Wright wrote copiously—leaving journals, memos, articles,
and letters—all flavored with the special
brand of low-key, wry wit that was characteristic of him. Wright had plenty to
write about. His career was replete with
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one-of-a-kind assignments, from being
in charge of President Calvin Coolidge’s
yacht to commanding a British submarine in World War II (though he was neither British nor a submarine officer).
Born in 1898 into an Army family,
Wright adored his father, and clearly the
feeling was mutual. “Pop” took his son
on hunting and fishing trips around the
world, and the young boy relished the experience. When Wright was only thirteen, then-Major William Wright,
stationed in Luzon as commander of the
Philippine Scouts, took the youngster,
armed with his own shotgun, on a military expedition to Mindanao to suppress
an uprising by the rebellious Moros,
Philippine Muslims. It was an adventure
from America’s brief colonial period,
more Kipling than Hemingway.
In 1914 Wright entered the Naval Academy (at sixteen) because there was no appointment available at West Point. He
graduated in only three years, because of
World War I. He was sent to Europe on
blockade duty, which also provided the
opportunity to visit his father, now Major General Wright, commanding the
89th Infantry Division on the Western
Front. However, the trip became more
than just a visit with “Pop” at his tented
headquarters when Ensign Wright was
caught in a German artillery barrage.
It did not take the young naval officer
long to realize that the U.S. Navy was the
right place for him. He derived personal
as well as professional satisfaction from
his assignment as naval aide to Coolidge
and from his subsequent deployment to
the China Station as executive officer of a
four-pipe destroyer.
Wright remained a bachelor as a junior
officer, but with his special charm and
tall good looks, he was much in demand
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in the social whirl of Washington, D.C.
There he met Phyllis Thompson, a society reporter for the thriving Washington
Star. They were married within a year.
Throughout the rest of his career they remained a devoted couple. Phyllis was always the exemplary Navy wife (she
published a book by that title), uncomplaining about the frequent moves and
long separations, and a pillar of support
for her husband in all his varied endeavors and often bizarre adventures.
During World War II, Wright commanded
major forces in action and served on personal liaison missions for the Allies. After
the war he served in the Pentagon, where,
because of his combat experience, he was
assigned to develop the operating policies
for the postwar Navy.
The real star in Wright’s crown, however,
was his tour as Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, one of the two top
posts in Nato. He handled that job with
such distinction that he served for six
years in what was normally a two-year assignment. His experiences in that critical
post at the height of the Cold War should
be of special interest to naval historians
and students of modern history.
After retiring from active duty as a
four-star admiral in 1960, he performed
his final service to the country in 1963,
when, at the urging of the secretary of
state, President John F. Kennedy appointed Wright to serve as U.S. ambassador
to Taiwan. Again Wright answered the
call of his country to serve in an assignment of great responsibility and unusual
sensitivity, one especially significant because of the instability of the Chinese
Nationalist government and the potential
threat to U.S. vital national interests.
David Key’s lack of familiarity with military jargon has allowed an occasional
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error to creep in, but these are few and
minor, limited generally to a garbled acronym or the misspelling of a ship’s
name. Otherwise the book rings with the
authority of an action report.
Admiral Jerauld Wright is a delightful
book, easy to pick up and hard to put
down. It is a biography of a splendid individual whose service and contributions
to his country constitute a significant historical record in itself. It is a story that
unfolds with the candor and humor of a
special person whose intellect and charm
made him a “diplomat among warriors.”
J. L. HOLLOWAY

Admiral, U.S. Navy, Retired

Hoffman, Jon T. Chesty: The Story of Lieutenant
General Lewis B. Puller, USMC. New York: Random
House, 2001. 629pp. $35

In the heralded history of the U.S. Marine Corps, Lewis B. “Chesty” Puller occupies a unique position. Long revered as
the greatest hero in the Corps, Puller is
the only Marine to earn five Navy
Crosses. His career spanned thirty-seven
years, during which he mastered the entire spectrum of warfare, from chasing
the guerrilla leader Augusto Sandino in
the jungles of Nicaragua to commanding
a Marine regiment in the bitter fighting
near the Chosin reservoir. Most Marines
are familiar with Burke Davis’s 1962 account of Puller’s life, but fellow leatherneck Jon T. Hoffman has produced what
is likely to become the definitive biography of this extraordinary officer.
Hoffman is no stranger to biography. His
Once a Legend: “Red Mike” Edson of the
Marine Raiders earned rave reviews from
a number of distinguished military historians and editors. As he did with Edson,
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Hoffman uses private papers, personal
military records, and recently declassified
federal documents in his attempt to discover the “real” Puller, stripped of decades
of mythology and near canonization.
What makes this current biography so
intriguing is Hoffman’s willingness to
confront the more controversial aspects
of Puller’s career, such as his performance at Peleliu, where his unit’s casualty rate exceeded 54 percent, as well as
his alleged indifference toward junior officers and to other services.
Puller was born in the Virginia Tidewater
in 1898 and enlisted in the Marine Corps
on 25 July 1918, too late to fight in
World War I. He first saw combat during
the interwar period, when the United
States frequently dispatched Marines to
quell domestic disturbances throughout
the Caribbean. The Puller legend was
born in Haiti and Nicaragua, where he
earned the sobriquet “El Tigre” and established a reputation as a brilliant
small-unit leader. His aggressive leadership won two Navy Crosses. Extended
foreign service in China and aboard Captain Chester Nimitz’s flagship, USS
Augusta (CA 31), added new laurels to
Puller’s growing reputation.
With the advent of World War II, Puller
actively sought combat duty. In September 1942 his battalion deployed to
Guadalcanal. One month later, he had
earned his third Navy Cross, in the defense of Henderson Field. Following a
short interlude, Puller won a fourth Navy
Cross in the battle at Cape Gloucester, on
New Britain Island. On both occasions,
Puller’s spirited leadership prevented the
desperate and determined enemy from
penetrating his defenses. On Guadalcanal
particularly, his officers and men were almost universal in their praise of his courage and leadership under fire.
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It was on New Britain that Puller first attracted a great deal of criticism for allegedly using his own casualty figures as a
measuring stick of how aggressively his
men were fighting. This criticism reached
new heights after Peleliu in September
1944, where a visibly tired Puller, now a
regimental commander, sustained disproportionate casualties in eradicating
the Japanese defenders. Hoffman rushes
to his defense, noting that Puller’s unit
did not have as much naval gunfire support available as the other regiments did,
and that service doctrine dictated maintaining momentum, which Puller’s regiment had gained. Moreover, Hoffman
points out, the terrain at Peleliu offered
little opportunity for maneuver; frontal
assault is almost always costly.
Allegations of Puller’s lack of tactical
imagination resurfaced in Korea, where
his regiment was instrumental in retaking Seoul in the immediate aftermath of
the Inchon landing. House-to-house
fighting proved slow and deadly, but
Puller took justifiable pride in his regiment’s role in seizing the South Korean
capital. Puller’s leadership during the
fighting withdrawal from the Chosin reservoir, in contrast, attracted a great deal
of favorable publicity. It was in fact nothing short of inspirational, earning him
his fifth and final Navy Cross.
Unfortunately, the years following Korea
brought only disillusionment to Puller.
Like General George S. Patton, Chesty
Puller was ill suited to the peacetime establishment. He was never politically astute; his blunt remarks about rugged
training and a “soft” American public
created a hailstorm of criticism from a
country long tired of war. What Puller
desired most was command of a Marine
division, but soon after he finally
achieved that lofty ideal in 1954, a stroke
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felled him, and he was relieved of command. Rather than retiring gracefully,
however, Puller fought the medical examiner’s board for over a year before the
secretary of the Navy informed him in
October 1955 that he would be retired.
For Puller, his forced retirement from active service was the ultimate betrayal by
the commandant and Headquarters, Marine Corps. In his twilight years, however, Puller mellowed a bit and took
personal satisfaction in seeing his family
reach maturity. He volunteered for active
service during the Vietnam War (his request was understandably denied). A vocal critic of government policy during the
war, Puller watched his son, Lewis Puller,
Jr., carry on the Puller name in combat.
As a sidelight, Hoffman provides an intimate portrayal of the relationship between father and son in the elder Puller’s
last days. Lewis Jr., who later recorded
his own experiences in a Pulitzer
Prize-winning autobiography, Fortunate
Son, was at his father’s side when Chesty
Puller, the greatest Marine in history,
succumbed to pneumonia and kidney infection on 11 October 1971.
The Puller who emerges from these pages
is not an altogether appealing figure but
one who merits the accolades that generations of Marines have bestowed upon
him. The fact that his Navy Crosses were
awarded for leadership during critical
stages of battle as opposed to individual
acts of bravery in no way diminishes
what Puller accomplished during his distinguished career. An unparalleled warrior and an enlisted leatherneck at heart,
Chesty Puller remains the most famous
and most revered Marine. It is fitting that
we finally have a biography that does justice to this extraordinary officer.
COLE C. KINGSEED

Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired
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La Bree, Clifton. The Gentle Warrior: General Oliver
Prince Smith, USMC. Kent, Ohio: Kent State Univ.
Press, 2001. 268pp. $32

Oliver Prince Smith was not present at
Belleau Wood or Chateau Thierry. Neither did he chase Sandino in Nicaragua.
He never served in Shanghai with the 4th
Marines. He missed the fighting on
Guadalcanal and Tarawa—early 1941 saw
him with the 1st Marine Brigade in Iceland, returning to the United States in
May 1942 for an eighteen-month stint in
the newly formed headquarters Division
of Plans and Policies. Consequently,
Smith’s first taste of combat did not
come until early 1944—fully twentyseven years after commissioning—at
New Britain, where he served initially as
chief of staff for the 1st Marine Division
and shortly as commander, 5th Marines,
for the Talasea Peninsula assault. Subsequently, at Peleliu he had the distinct
misfortune to serve as assistant commander of the 1st Marine Division under
Major General William H. Rupertus. He
would finish his World War II service as
Marine deputy chief of staff for the Tenth
Army at Okinawa.
Smith went through the Reserve Officers
Training Corps program at the University of California, Berkeley, and was commissioned a second lieutenant in 1917.
He was ordered to Guam, followed by
shipboard duty, then Washington, D.C.,
three years in Haiti, and the Army’s Field
Officer School at Fort Benning in 1931.
Subsequently, Smith taught at Marine
Corps Schools in Quantico, following
which he became the first Marine officer
to matriculate at the French École de
Guerre. Returning to the United States,
he was again assigned as an instructor at
Quantico, where, because of his obvious

16

War College: Book Reviews
BOOK REVIEWS

intellectual power, he acquired the nicknames “the professor” and the “student
general.”
Smith was not a colorful character. A
practicing Christian Scientist, he did not
drink (although he did smoke a pipe),
and he did not use profanity. In fact,
when he spoke at all he rarely raised his
voice above a normal speaking level.
“Taciturn” probably describes him best.
Consequently, when in spring 1950, after
serving as Marine Corps assistant commandant, Smith received orders as commanding general, 1st Marine Division,
there was not a little heartburn among
other Marine general officers, which only
intensified when that division deployed
to Korea.
Yet if ever there was an officer with the
right qualifications at the right place at
the right time, it was Major General Oliver Prince Smith.
It was O.P. who worked closely and effectively with Rear Admiral James H. Doyle
on a very short time line to plan the September 1950 landing at Inchon, with
higher echelons back-dating their operation orders to conform with those produced at the lower levels. Like Doyle,
O.P. was a practical-minded, hardheaded
professional who cared not a whit for
high-blown rhetoric or elegant maps,
only for getting the job done. It was O.P.
who wisely resisted great pressure from
his corps commander to accelerate his division’s advance on Seoul in order to
meet an artificial schedule for securing
that city; urgings to make a dangerous
night attack once in Seoul; and attempts
to interfere in his division’s internal
chain of command.
The extraordinary performance of the 1st
Marine Division at Chosin is widely
known. Less obvious was O.P.’s
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contribution to that performance. Again,
he wisely resisted considerable pressure
from his corps commander to quick-pace
the division’s advance to the Yalu. Cognizant of the danger posed by the Chinese entry into the war, O.P. doggedly strove to
keep his division concentrated. Smith developed a main supply route with defensible redoubts that made possible the
division’s long fighting retreat from Chosin
to Hamhung. Earlier, in the belief that the
war would extend well into the bitter Korean winter, he had insisted on coldweather gear for his Marines. He kept in
continuous personal contact with his regimental commanders by means of helicopter (the first field commander to do so) and
jeep, and yet he refrained from interfering
with their exercise of command.
By these deeds, this reviewer is persuaded
that O. P. Smith saved a great many fine
men from certain capture, injury, or
death. Much beloved by his men, O.P. reciprocated; in his personal log he kept
handwritten daily and running casualty
figures for the division. Perhaps the
best-known photo of O. P. Smith is of
him standing alone among graves of his
men in the cemetery at Hamhung.
Smith was neither good news material
nor well known outside Marine circles;
he was a very private and modest person.
For example, he confided to his wife his
deep embarrassment on receiving a Silver
Star from General Douglas MacArthur,
an award he deemed inappropriate for a
division commander not directly in the
line of fire. Such humility and personal
reserve neither attract biographers nor
render their task easy (in Korea he was
easily eclipsed by his 1st Marines commander, the colorful “Chesty” Puller).
Thus, the absence of a biography of
Smith until now is no surprise, but the
lacuna has been a serious one. That there
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is now such a biography is owed to the
perseverance of the publisher’s executive
director, who served in the 1st Marine
Division after the Korean War.
Fortunately for his biographer, O.P. kept
meticulous records of his professional
life, comprising some three dozen boxes
in the Marine Corps University Archives
and, more important, a detailed, daily
personal log of his Korean War service.
La Bree conducted interviews with officers who had served with O.P. to help fill
in the blanks.
Gentle Warrior would have benefited had
the author provided a broader context
for the historical events in which its protagonist participated. It would also have
been improved by more attention to the
first decades of O.P.’s career, which are
largely omitted—official records could
have provided at least grist for the mill
here. That O.P.’s youth and college years
are absent from this account is due principally to his family’s desire for privacy,
which the author respected. Thus we do
not really know the father to the
man—the account really starts with
O.P.’s deployment to Iceland.
Nonetheless, this is a good, honest book.
It is probably not the definitive account
of O.P.’s life and career, but we are fortunate to have it. He emerges as a consummate, dedicated professional military
officer who served his country and his
Marine Corps extremely well and did so
with little fanfare or expectation of public approbation. On more than one occasion, Smith risked his career to speak
truth to power. In short, there is much
worth emulating in the character and career of O. P. Smith. Serving officers
would do well to read this book and absorb its lessons.
DONALD CHISHOLM

Naval War College
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Probert, Henry. Bomber Harris, His Life and Times:
The Biography of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir
Arthur Harris, the Wartime Chief of Bomber Command. London: Greenhill, 2001. 432pp. $34.95

In the 1920s, early in his career, when Arthur Harris commanded 45 Squadron in
Iraq, he was concerned with improving
the accuracy of his unit’s bomb aiming.
Can this be the same man who, twenty
years later, was responsible for leading
the Royal Air Force Bomber Command’s
area-bombing campaign against the cities
of the Third Reich, the apogee of which
was the apocalyptic raid on Dresden in
February 1945?
Yes and no. As Henry Probert demonstrates in his admirable biography of this
most controversial Allied airman, Harris
did indeed stress the need for his bombers to operate efficiently and effectively as
they policed their corner of the British
Empire, and he continued to emphasize
these qualities for the remainder of his
career. Harris cannot be made to bear
personal responsibility for either the
area-bombing strategy in general, or the
Dresden raid in particular. Although
Harris became a lightning rod for postwar criticism of the strategic air offensive, the critical decisions were made
higher up the chain of command by the
Chiefs of Staff , the War Cabinet, and
Winston Churchill. In pointing out this
simple but often overlooked fact,
Probert, like Robin Neillands in his recent The Bomber War (Overlook Press,
2001), seeks to debunk myths and set the
record straight by putting Harris in his
proper historical context.
In some respects this task is not an easy
one, but Probert is well qualified to make
the attempt. A retired RAF air commodore with a long record of service,
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Probert is also a former head of the Air
Historical Branch of the Ministry of Defence. For this biography he was given
unrestricted access to Harris’s substantial
collection of personal papers. Probert has
made good use of this archive and of the
interviews he conducted with Harris’s
friends and associates. His aim, he writes,
is to present a biography of the man
rather than yet another history of the
bombing campaign, and there is much
detail here that cannot be found elsewhere, even in the authorized biography
by Dudley Saward, which was written in
the 1970s but not published until after
Harris’s death in 1984. Probert rightly
judges Saward’s book to be disappointing, not least because it leaves many
questions unanswered.
Yet while the author attempts to offer a
rounder picture of the man by examining
Harris’s pre- and post–Bomber Command life, readers will inevitably be
drawn to those chapters dealing with the
war years. Despite Probert’s desire not to
retell the story of Bomber Command, he
feels it necessary to offer some verdict on
the air campaign itself. Here he wisely
follows the lead of Richard Overy (King’s
College, London) in concluding that the
night area offensive did much more damage to the German war effort than it has
been given credit for, mainly by diverting
resources to the defence of the Reich,
putting a ceiling on industrial production, and generally disrupting economic
and social life.
The picture of Harris that emerges is in
some ways all too familiar. He was just
the tonic that was needed at Bomber
Command Headquarters in High
Wycombe when he took up his appointment in February 1942. He was a
strong-willed, opinionated, and forceful
commander who promised to inject a
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sense of purpose into a force that was
flagging, and to do his utmost to build up
its striking power. In this he was spectacularly successful, but his success came at
a price. Harris’s personality was a liability
as well as an asset, and this was never
more apparent than in his dealings with
the staff officers of the Air Ministry. One
of Probert’s strengths is his understanding of the decision-making machinery
and the bureaucratic and institutional
framework within which bombing policy
was made, a dimension of the story that
is too often neglected or misunderstood.
Relations between Bomber Command
and the Air Ministry’s Directorate of
Bomber Operations were frosty, due in
no small part to Harris’s contempt for
what he believed to be the Air Staff’s
ill-advised criticism of, and interference
in, the operation of his command. To a
certain extent his views were justified, although one does not get from Probert a
full sense of the deep distrust that some
members of the Air Staff had of Harris’s
judgment and of his readiness to obey
orders. Yet it takes two to tango, and
too often Harris was overeager to
dance. In addition to possessing a
weakness for exaggeration, he could be
inflexible, intolerant, scathingly sarcastic, and narrow minded in his view of the
war. The results were frequently counterproductive, introducing unnecessary friction into the business of running the
bomber offensive. Sometimes he was
right, as in his denunciation of the pointless attacks on the concrete-reinforced
U-boat pens on the French coast. At
other times, however, he was dead
wrong, as in his dogmatic dismissal of oil
as just another “panacea” target.
Probert is too conscientious a biographer
to excuse Harris’s lapses uncritically, but
he also seems a bit too willing to give his
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subject the benefit of the doubt,
suggesting in his concluding remarks that
others might have misinterpreted or misunderstood what Harris was trying to say
or do. He is surely right in judging him
to be one of the great commanders of the
Second World War. If that is the case,
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however, it is equally true to say that
Bomber Command achieved as much as
it did not only because of Sir Arthur Harris but in spite of him.
LORNE BREITENLOHNER

University of Toronto
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